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The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: 
“Bridging” Turkey’s Location, Role and Identity 
After the End of the Cold War
The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision Lerna K. Yanik
LERNA K. YANIK
Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
During the Cold War, “buffer” or “bastion” seemed a popular met-
aphor to describe Turkey. After the Cold War, “bridge,” (and, to
some extent, the “crossroad”) metaphor started to dominate the
Turkish foreign policy discourse. This article traces the use of
“bridge” metaphor in this discourse in the post-Cold War period by
the Turkish foreign policy elite. It develops two arguments. First,
the word bridge is a “metaphor of vision” combining Turkey’s per-
ceived geographical exceptionalism with an identity and a role at
the international level. As a “metaphor of vision,” the employment
of the word “bridge” highlighted Turkey’s liminality and justified
some of its foreign policy actions to Eurasia and then to the Middle
East. Second, because the bridge metaphor was used in different
context to justify different foreign policy choices, its meaning has
changed, illustrating that metaphors are not static constructs. It
concludes by saying that the continuous use of “bridge” metaphor
might reinforce Turkey’s “liminality,” placing Turkey in a less clas-
sifiable category than the regular “othering” practices.
When the subject is Turkish politics, one frequently encounters books or
articles that contain the words “Turkey,” “between,” “East” and “West” in
their titles.1 Even if the title does not contain any of these words, it is very
likely that, be it an article, a book or a monograph, there will be a reference
to how “important,” “troubled,” or for that matter, “difficult,” Turkey’s
geography is.2 Such titles are so abundant that sometimes rather than saying
something new about Turkey’s politics, they end up bolstering Turkish
geographical “exceptionalism.” Oftentimes, this reference to Turkey’s
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532 Lerna K. Yanik
geographical “exceptionalism” is created, recreated and highlighted when
policy makers, media and academia employ metaphors to describe Turkey’s
“uniqueness.”3
During the Cold War, “buffer” or “bastion” seemed a popular metaphor
to describe Turkey. After the Cold War, the “bridge,” (and, to some extent,
the “crossroad”) metaphor has come to dominate the discourse, not only
discursively, but also visually. In addition to various policy makers referring
to Turkey as a “bridge,” the image of Ortaköy Mosque in the foreground
and Bosphorus Bridge in the background, as seen from Istanbul’s well-
known Ortaköy Square, for example, has become a stereotypical photo
backdrop for officials ranging from George W. Bush, in June 2004 to Queen
Elizabeth II, in May 2008, and many others before and after them,
(re)producing Turkey’s “exceptionalism.” This article examines the discursive
creation of this geographical exceptionalism through the use of the “bridge”
metaphor, by Turkish officials in the context of Turkish foreign policy dis-
course in the post–Cold War period.
Needless to say, Turkey is neither the only country to associate itself
with a metaphor nor to make a claim to geographical “exceptionalism” by
using metaphors in its foreign policy discourse. One can easily find numerous
cases, where different countries (or regions, for that matter) are associated
with metaphors such as a bridge, crossroads, fortress, etc.4 In other words,
the claim for exceptionalism is no exception, and since many different
countries make the claim to be “exceptional” in some geopolitical sense, in
the end, no country is that exceptional.
Yet there are several reasons that make the study of Turkish
“exceptionalism” worthwhile. First, the metaphors underscoring Turkey’s
“uniqueness” are more than a geopolitical imagination/representation, or a
“branding strategy,” as has been argued elsewhere.5 Borrowing the term
“geopolitical visions” from Dijkink,6 I refer to these metaphors as
“metaphors of visions.” Geopolitical visions are the ways in which a state
relates itself to the world order. This relating process, Dijkink argues, comes
as a result of how a state’s elites perceive their history, think of their
national identity, and imagine their country’s location, eventually, all
affecting how these elites plan and execute a country’s foreign policy.7 Put
differently, these metaphors do not merely imply imaginations or represen-
tations regarding the geographical location of a country. In addition to
geographical imaginations/representations, they also give us clues to the
international role and the identity that a state aspires to, or plans to become.
Second, the Turkish case is a paradoxical one. When Turkish officials will-
ingly use the metaphor “bridge” or claim that Turkey is located at the
“crossroads,” or the “intersection” of three continents, it means that Turkish
officials are consciously settling with a liminal, and, recently, with a liminal-
marginal international identity. As has been argued by most scholars of
international relations, liminality is neither a wise thing to be nor to
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The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision 533
become.8 As a result of the Turkish officials’ willingness to use the “bridge”
metaphor to highlight Turkey’s liminality, Turkey’s “othering” by Europe (and
now by the European Union [EU]), which has persisted since medieval times,9
is continuously reinforced, this time in a liminal manner, not by the Europeans
or the EU per se, but by the Turkish elite. Third, despite the existence of
literature that depicts Turkey’s international affairs in metaphorical terms,10 so
far there has not been an attempt to analyse these metaphors of vision that
Turkish elites use. Consequently, I believe, not the Turkish geography, but
the study of Turkey’s geographical “exceptionalism” is exceptional.
I develop two arguments while tracing and analysing metaphors of
vision that Turkish foreign policy elites use. As noted previously, these
metaphors, on the surface denote only geography, but in reality, combine
geographical imaginations, role and identity. Thus, the first argument that I
make is that these metaphors of vision are indeed discursive strategies
employed by Turkish foreign policy elite to frame and to justify various
foreign policy goals. Since metaphors are more powerful signifiers than
simple words modifying the discourse, and since these metaphors of vision
contain the claim to accomplish several things at a time, their capability to
help shape reality is more powerful.
The literature about the use of metaphors in politics is vast. Those that
have researched this topic have argued that metaphors can create “new
contexts” and “establish new relationships,”11 and thus impact how reality
(along with knowledge) is created, understood, disseminated12 and also
reinforced.13 Moreover, metaphors not only shape reality, but also help it to
“gain authority.”14 This, in turn, aids policy makers in legitimising and
justifying their policies, not only to themselves, but also to the masses.15 In
other words, metaphor is more than a simple linguistic, conceptual
construct; it is a cognitive and a discursive tool, which, step by step, can
help the reasoning of the rulers and the ruled.16 Aside from the arrows of
reasoning released in the minds, some scholars even argue that despite the
hard-to-prove causal link, metaphors might even be considered as the first
steps taken towards an action, including a policy maker’s choices as well as
his/her goals.17 Finally, metaphors are extremely important sources of
ambiguity, which give a good deal of leeway for politicians to manoeuvre
while thinking, speaking and making policies,18 deflecting responsibility as
a result.19 Overall, from an elite perspective, metaphors are extremely useful
constructs that create a favourable context to pursue their policies,20 serving
the policy goals of these elites. When policy makers say that “country X is a
bridge,” or “is positioned at a crossroads,” they are not simply using some
vivid language to make their statement. Rather they are combining a
discursive practice, with a geopolitical imagination/representation, and also,
with an international function and identity they are aspiring to play and
become. That way, metaphors of vision are more powerful than a mere
geopolitical imagination or a representation or a mere use of metaphor.
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534 Lerna K. Yanik
Metaphors of visions are discursive strategies that combine territorial, func-
tional and ideational self-perception with a linguistic practice that furthers and
deepens the “exceptionalist lore” that a state needs to survive and thrive.21
The second argument that I put forward is that although after the end
of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy elite used the very same “bridge”
metaphor, because it justified and framed different foreign policy choices in
different contexts, the meaning that was associated with the metaphor also
changed. Consequently, since the meaning associated with the metaphor
was also transformed, Turkey’s liminality was also reinforced in different
realms. As will be argued below, when Turkish foreign policy elite used the
“bridge” metaphor throughout the 1990s, they portrayed Turkey as a coun-
try having a hybrid international identity. That is, Turkey was portrayed as a
country with each foot in a different continent, Europe and Asia that is, and
belonging equally to two different civilisations, Western and Eastern at the
same time, yet mostly carrying Western values, i.e., more democratic com-
pared to the surrounding countries, a market economy, secular, etc. While
this hybridity helped Turkey to make the case for Turkey’s liminal identity,
or to quote Rumelili, Turkey was a “prime example of a liminal state,”22 it
highlighted Turkey’s commonality with Europe rather than its differences.
However, after the 9/11 attacks and the accession of the “reformed
Islamist” AKP (Justice and Development Party) to power, this portrayal of a
hybrid Turkey got a new twist. Though some of these hybrid features of
Turkey such as being in the two continents, etc., were kept, religion was
introduced into the discourse. This introduction happened when the AKP
launched the United Nations (UN)–led “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative
with Spain and made the claim that Turkey, in addition to “bridging”
continents and Eastern and Western civilisations, could also “bridge” “West”
and “Islam.” This was a novelty because, bringing Islam, a feature that is not
inherent to Europe, into discourse, while keeping Turkey’s liminality on
some grounds intact, it also introduced some level of marginality to
Turkey’s international identity, making Turkey liminal-marginal. No matter
how Turkish officials insisted on using the metaphor bridge in the sense of
a mediator or an arbiter, Turkey, in a sense, ended up becoming a possible
spokesperson for Islam. That way, while Turkish foreign policy elite contin-
ued to use the same “bridge,” because they used it in a different context, the
meaning of the “bridge” metaphor changed from one of mediator/stabiliser/
facilitator to a spokesperson. In sum, this article is neither about the making
of Turkish geographical “exceptionalism,” nor about making the case for a
causal link between metaphors, policy choice and policy outcome. Rather, it
is about the deconstruction of this geographical “exceptionalism” puzzle that
is often used by Turkish foreign policy makers utilising metaphors as discur-
sive strategies.
In order to analyse this puzzle, I tracked down speeches that were
delivered at various fora by the top-level Turkish officials involved in the
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The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision 535
making of Turkish foreign policy from the 1990s until today. Though the
making of Turkish foreign policy rests mostly with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, because of their extensive involvement, I have included the
speeches of prime ministers or presidents. Additionally, because the govern-
ments changed very frequently in Turkey in the 1990s, I limited my analysis
to the speeches of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs who
stayed in power more than a year. Some of these speeches, especially for
the speeches of Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller, Ismail Cem,
Bülent Ecevit, and Abdullah Gül (as the minister of foreign affairs) I benefited
from a collection of speeches that had been published. For Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, Ali Babacan and Abdullah Gül (as the president), the Internet,
websites of the appropriate government branch and newspapers were the
primary sources. When I used newspapers or the Internet sources, I made sure
that these were exact quotes of the foreign policy elite. That is, I paid particular
attention to the use of metaphors of vision denoting Turkey’s “uniqueness” or
“exceptionalism.” I then put these references into a timeline taking a note of
the way the metaphors were used, of the context in which they were used
and also of the audience that these speeches containing the “bridge”
metaphor were delivered to. Here, I should also note that some Turkish
officials more frequently used the “bridge” metaphor than others. In the
texts that I analysed some Turkish officials like Necmettin Erbakan, Bülent
Ecevit and Ahmet Necdet Sezer never or rarely use the “bridge” metaphor.
Overall, Turkish metaphors of vision contribute to the field by showing that
metaphors are dynamic, rather than static constructs, which help policy
elites justify and frame their policy choices discursively.
LOCATING TURKEY IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA: HOW 
METAPHOR AND LOCATION STAYS THE SAME WHILE 
MEANING CHANGES
Turkey’s “important,” “unique,” “exceptional,” or “difficult” geography or
“Turkey’s geopolitics” are the most frequently mentioned characteristics of
the country’s politics. Bilgin argues that the idea of geopolitics (or jeopolitik,
in Turkish), first entered into the Turkish lexicon through the Turkish
Armed Forces after World War II. After it emerged within the military, the
word geopolitics and thus the issue of underscoring Turkey’s location took
on a life of its own among civilian elites. The geopolitics discourse, then,
was used to justify Turkey’s external and internal security policies.23
However, tracing the evolution of jeopolitik from official documents to
school textbooks, is not the only way to analyse the reconstructions of the
geography that Turkey occupies. Analysing the metaphors of vision that
Turkish foreign policy elite employed in the post–Cold War period can tell
us about geopolitical constructions, and about much more, as well.
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536 Lerna K. Yanik
There are two reasons why this analysis is limited to Turkey’s
metaphors of vision produced in the post–Cold War period. The first reason
is to make this project more manageable in terms of scope. Even this period
is enough to make the case that metaphors are dynamic constructs helping
elites justify their foreign policy options. This limitation, naturally, does not
mean that Turkish foreign policy elite did not use metaphors of visions
before the end of the Cold War. As mentioned earlier, throughout the
twentieth century different metaphors were employed to describe Turkey,
or its uniqueness.24 The second reason is that the post–Cold War period was
like a social science lab for Turkey (and many others), in a sense, enabling
the analysis of how policy makers discursively react to changing structural
parameters at the international level. It was a period where Turkey’s location,
international function and identity had started to be debated as the Cold War
was coming to an end. In 1989, for example, Turkey’s application for Euro-
pean Community (EC) membership was rejected, dashing Turkish policy
makers’ hopes to officially become part of “Europe.” Two years later, when
the Soviet Union dissolved, Turkey’s function and identity had to be resized
and redefined. During the Cold War, capitalising on its geographical “excep-
tionalism” by presenting itself as a “bastion” or a “bulwark,” on the southern
flank of NATO, Turkey had to play the protector role in the first line of
defence against communism. However, since the days of communism were
over, security was no longer the prime issue that Turkey’s foreign policy elite
could use to make their case for an important role.25 They had to find some-
thing else to highlight the country’s continued importance in world politics.
Turkish foreign policy discourse during these years is reflective of the
foreign policy makers’ struggle to redefine Turkey’s role and identity in the
new global order. Though in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War,
rhetorically, Turkish foreign policy elite kept affirming and reaffirming how
“unique” “special” or “important” Turkey’s geography still was,26 they
nevertheless had to put this rhetoric into practice as well. For example, after
the first Gulf War, Turkey allowed Operation Provide Comfort/ Operation
Northern Watch, which kept Kurds in Northern Iraq away from the reach of
Saddam Hussein, to operate from Turkey.27 Moreover, Turkey pursued an
active policy of drawing the international attention to the ethnic war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.28 It was, however, Turkey’s ties to the East, especially
with the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union, which became the
leverage that Turkish officials were looking for at the international level.
And it was within this context that Turkish officials mostly, but not
exclusively, started to employ metaphors of vision. Once again, just like in
the days of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy elite chose to capitalise on
Turkey’s geographical “exceptionalism.”
Interestingly, initially, Turkish officials preferred to describe these ties
with the Turkic Republics in neutral terms.29 Then, for a while, Turkey was
portrayed as a “gate” to Eurasia, or a “gate” between East and West.30 After
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The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision 537
using the “gate” and the “bridge” metaphor simultaneously in late 1994 and
early 1995,31 the Turkish foreign policy elite settled on the “bridge”
metaphor. Two trends of meaning can be observed in the way these
metaphors are used: Turkey portrayed as “bridging continents,” and Turkey
portrayed as “bridging civilisations.”
Turkey Bridging Continents: The Midwife of “Eurasia” and a Model-
Stabiliser-Facilitator
As the Cold War was coming to an end, Turkish officials claimed that
Turkey could be a “bridge” between “Europe and the Middle East.”32After
the end of the Cold War, in addition to Europe and the Middle East,
suddenly other continents worth “bridging” appeared on the maps of Turkish
officials: Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, but most importantly, Eurasia. Turkish
officials perceived and portrayed Turkey as located in the “heart”33 of Eurasia,
and as helping to reunite two continents that had been separated for years:
Europe and Asia. For Hikmet Çetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1991
and 1994, Turkey was located “at a crossroads, meeting point of a key region,
Atlantic, Europe, Eurasia region, that with the help of scientific, technological
and economic potential would turn into a locomotive of global peace and
welfare.”34 Some others, like Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
between 1997 and 2002, and one of the most important advocates of the
“Eurasia” idea in Turkey, went as far as to say that “Turkey was both
European and an Asian.”35 The mindset of the Turkish foreign policy elite in
the early post–Cold War years was that Turkey was an “island” or a
“bastion” of stability in the midst of a troubled region.36 To quote Çetin,
Turkey’s geography dictated Turkey’s responsibility to create a “peace belt”
using political and economic cooperation as a tool.37
In 1995, for example, then Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, who would be
the minister of foreign affairs in a year, while commenting on the possible
delay in Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union with the European Union,
would play into the hands of her rival Islamist party in Turkey, and was
quoted by Time magazine as such:
And is not just Turkey that is concerned there: there are also millions of
Turkic speaking people of Central Asia who are looking at two models:
ours or the Iranians. I see my tasks as changing the history because
Turkey can become a bridge for peace between the two areas. If it does
not, the two regions will be divided in confrontation with each other.
We can be the link. We are democratic, we are secular and our
economy is the first open, sophisticated economy in the area.38
Similarly, on one rare early occasion that Süleyman Demirel used the
bridge metaphor, he said:
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538 Lerna K. Yanik
Turkey, with its 60 million population, money and other possibilities, is
a bridge to West Asia, to the Middle East. It is a model for Muslim coun-
tries. . . . Here’s the model: an independent, democratic, secular country,
employing a free market economy. Turkey is the only model.39
When, for example, Demirel is asked to comment on Turkey’s ties with
the EU, he summarises in one paragraph the evolution of the Turkish
mindset, which declared that Turkey was a “bridge” to Eurasia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey, once a castle of defense
[sic] has turned into bridge. That is, Eurasia has come into being,
[Turkey] has become a bridge between Europe and Eurasia. In a sense,
it [Turkey] has become a stepping stone, it has not lost its strategic impor-
tance, yet, in addition to this has improved its eco-strategic importance.40
Excerpts from the Turkish elites show that using these metaphors of
vision helped them to kill three birds with one stone. First, still keeping (for
the most part) the “bridge” to the Middle East, these metaphors helped to
justify their role in newly “discovered” Eurasia as an economic/governance
mediator/model/facilitator.41 Turkey, to Turkish officials, was the best
democratic, secular – yet Muslim – country in the region for the newly
independent Turkic republics (and to some extent, for the Middle Eastern
countries) to use as a model. Second, Turkey was performing an interna-
tional public service, so to speak, for the good of everyone involved. By
portraying Saudi Arabia and Iran as the bogeymen, Turkey was the bulwark
against the danger of religious extremism that these countries could spread.
Moreover, Turkey was presented as an actor that could possibly help these
resource-rich countries of the former Soviet Union to open up to world
economy. Third, consequently, because Turkey was helping these newly
independent states to stand on their own feet, it was midwifing the birth of
a new continent: Eurasia. But more importantly, Turkish officials expressed
their interest to become a mediator-stabiliser-facilitator in the region by
bringing Western values, democracy, market economy and secularism to the
region. Though proposing to be a “bridge” in the sense of a mediator-
stabiliser-facilitator in a newly emerging region still maintained Turkey’s lim-
inal identity, Turkish officials could illustrate Turkey’s continued usefulness
and importance to the United States and the EU practically and discursively.
Turkey Bridging Civilisations: From Bridging “East and West” 
to Bridging “West and Islam” and Becoming the “Spokesperson” 
for Islam?
While Turkey “bridging continents” was the discourse dominating Turkish
foreign policy elites’ perceptions in the 1990s, Turkey “bridging civilisations”
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The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision 539
replaced this in the subsequent years, becoming the prevailing discourse in the
2000s. Using the bridge metaphor this time to connect civilisations, Turkey was
initially portrayed more as an arbiter, or a mediator that could connect with and
create peace among civilisations, than as a possible spokesperson for Islam.
Two points are important in this specific discourse. First, although
“bridging civilisations” has become the leading discourse in Turkey in the
2000s, one can see the traces of Turkish elites perceiving Turkey as
“bridging civilisations,” as early as late 1993, long before it dominates the
discourse. Speaking to the members of the European Media Union, Çiller
described Turkey as:
the meeting point of continents and civilizations. . . . We are the heir to
the Roman, Greek, Ottoman and many other cultures. All these past civ-
ilizations have enriched our culture and understanding. The bridge at
the Istanbul Strait countries [sic] not only physically connects Asia and
Europe, but also in terms of values.42
As Çiller’s statement coincides with the publication of Samuel Huntington’s
famous article “The Clash of Civilizations” in Foreign Affairs, in the summer
of 1993, her timing is neither an accident, nor is she alone in portraying
Turkey as a “bridge between civilizations.” Ismail Cem also highlighted
Turkey’s “multicivilizational past,” (or “geography of civilizations,”43 as he
later coins) as early as 1995, first as the Minister of Culture44 and then as the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Cem believed that “history is the decisive factor
in defining Turkey’s past and her present.”45 After listing Turkey’s “five main
assets” of Turkey, which, according to Cem, were history, culture, “thriving”
economy, stability and the “Turkish Model,”46 Cem, in September 1997 at
the UN General Assembly, argued that one basis of Turkish foreign policy
should be “Turkey’s historical geography.”47 For Cem, Turkey,
located at the crossroads of three continents and several regions, includ-
ing the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, has an
effective role in the maintenance of peace, security and stability in its
wider region. We have lived together with peoples who actually consti-
tute 26 contemporary independent States [sic]. Today, the historical and
cultural attributes of this vast geography, more than ever, find their
expression in Turkey’s foreign policy. . . .48 At the dawn of a new
millennium, we are confident that Turkey will have a leadership role in
its wider region. It will continue to be the bridge, the communicator and
the peacemaker.49
Even in the late 1990s, Turkish officials had started to play the civilisa-
tion card against a reluctant EU. In November 1997, for example (just before
the Luxembourg Summit that did not grant Turkey EU candidate status),
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540 Lerna K. Yanik
Turkey’s supposed ability to “bridge civilisations” started to become a tool
to justify Turkey’s EU membership. Cem, for example, said that
the EU is now deciding on its enlargement process. One important deci-
sion is what role to offer Turkey, which provides Western Europe’s main
historical, cultural and economic links to Eastern horizons. The choice
that the EU makes will either provide the EU with a crucial bridge of
conciliation with civilizations of other characteristics, or will be discrimi-
natory and have no effect, or even negative effects on the persisting
dichotomies.50
In 1998, at the opening ceremony of the Turkish Parliament, Demirel
made a similar reference. “Turkey,” he said, “with its position bridging
North and South and East and West, assumes a major role in contributing to
the harmonization of cultures and civilizations.”51 Though the statement did
not directly address the EU, nevertheless, it was clearly meant to send a
message to the EU that was dragging its feet regarding Turkey’s membership.
Yet this early understanding of “civilisations” that highlighted common
points with the West, both in terms of roots and values, was replaced with
an understanding of civilisation that did not highlight commonalities, but
rather a difference. That is, in the early 2000s, Islam entered into the
Turkey’s “bridging” discourse, eventually becoming one of the contexts in
which the “bridge” metaphor was used. In addition to Huntington’s “Clash
of Civilization” thesis, several other issues prepared the ground for this
change. First, towards the end of the 1990s, it became clear that Turkey
“bridging continents,” i.e., being a model/stabiliser/facilitator to/for the
countries to its East, especially for the Turkic republics did not look like
something that was viable. Throughout the 1990s (and even today), Turkey
was embroiled in an armed struggle with Kurdish separatists, meaning that
the country that was offering stability to others was not itself that stable.
What is more, Turkey experienced several major economic crises during
these years, combining economic instability with the political one. It was
soon clear that Turkey neither looked like a model/stabiliser/facilitator nor
were these countries willing to see Turkey as such. This situation ended the
credibility of a discourse in which Turkey was portrayed as a “bridge”
between “continents,” taking Western values to the East. This of course, did
not mean that Turkish officials completely stopped using the Turkey “bridg-
ing continents” discourse. That discourse also continued, but faded into the
background because of the emergence of the discourse based on Turkey’s
supposed ability to “bridge civilisations.”
In addition to the limited opportunity that the “bridging continents”
discourse had, the 9/11 attacks gave the opportunity to Turkish foreign
policy elite to declare Turkey a “bridge” that connected “civilisations.” The
fact that perpetrators and the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks were Muslims
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and that in the aftermath American president George W. Bush declared
America to be on a “crusade” against terrorism indicated that Samuel
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis was finding supporters within
the American foreign policy circles and among their like-minded allies.
Turkish foreign policy elite were simply reacting to this discourse. More
important than the increased support for the Clash of Civilizations thesis,
the attacks of 9/11 firmly introduced a discourse centred on “civilisations,”
producing, reproducing and reinforcing the image of a Manichean world
based on two religions – Islam and Christianity.
In February 2002, for example, a few months after the 9/11 attacks,
Turkish officials got the chance to put their rhetoric regarding civilisations
into action by hosting a joint forum called “The Meeting of Civilizations”
with the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and EU member and
candidate countries in Istanbul. Ismail Cem in his speech said that “Turkey
was hosting this forum with a special duty and a mission. We have ties to
both ICO and the EU. We are at the same time both European and Asian
country. We are the representative of culture that has roots both in the East
and the West.”52At that meeting, even Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister at the
time, and who rarely used metaphors of vision in his speeches, said, “We
are in a position to bridge Europe and Asia, and East and West.”53 This ver-
sion of the “civilisations” discourse developed in the late 1990s and around
2001, was quite different from what it would become in a couple of years’
time. It was more cultural, less religious and it was willing to portray Turkey
as the heir of empires of pre-Ottoman Anatolia, emphasising a degree of
commonality with the West, especially with Europe.
The religious twist to the “Turkey bridging civilisations” discourse,
however, came to the forefront after the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) came to power in November 2002. The AKP, which some observers
call a “reformed Islamist party,” was established in 2001, by a splinter group
from the last of the series of parties that successively represented the
religious conservative National View movement. Although the AKP pre-
sented itself as “conservative democrats” and a centre party, it was during
their time that the religious twist was added to the Turkey “bridging civilisa-
tions” discourse. This religious twist came with the launching of the “Alli-
ance of Civilizations” initiative in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime
Minister and the head of the AKP, and the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero who led the initiative officially described the “Alliance of
Civilizations” as an effort “to contribute to the creation of unity, cooperation
and harmonization by attaching priority to common universal values between
cultures.”54 More interesting than the initiative’s goal were Erdogan’s remarks
about what Turkey was bridging this time: the West and Islam.
Some circles are trying to interpret 11 September as the preliminary
signal of clash among civilizations and religions. It is necessary to stress
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that clash among religions is not inevitable. The real clash is between
those who are Muslim, Christian or Jewish who adopt universal values
and those who believe in the opposite. . . . Within this context EU
membership of Turkey will be a significant contribution to establishment
of a bridge between the West and Islam [sic] world. Together with
Turkey’s EU membership, criticisms and racism accusations like ‘EU is a
Christian Union’ will end.55
Replacing “East and West,” or using it along with “West and Islam,” or
with “Islam and Christianity,” makes a big difference in the way Turkey is
portrayed, perceived and presented. Here it should be noted that while PM
Erdogan preferred to portray Turkey as “bridging West and Islam,” other
members of the AKP, such as (the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
current President) Abdullah Gül, just like his predecessors portrayed Turkey
“at the intersection of different regions,”56 or said that Turkey “constitute[d]
a natural bridge between Europe or Asia.”57 However, as Kösebalaban
argues, adding a religious flavour to the civilisations discourse is an
immense change of Turkish attitude towards Europe. Because until the AKP
took over Turkey’s European vocation, the point of Turkey’s membership to
EU was that Turkey would be integrated into some other “civilisation.” Now
that Turkey was assuming this role between Islam and Christianity, the AKP
government was asking Europe to accept Islam, another civilisation, into
Europe.58 Taking the vague concept of “universal values” as a base, Turkey
was, in a sense, volunteering for the task of presenting Islam, a religion, and
one that is not inherent to West, rather than the East, to the West. This meant
the introduction of a less secular and more religious sense about Turkey’s
location, role and identity, and highlighted Turkey’s Islamic credentials, rather
than its commonality with Europe in other realms. With this change the
“bridge” metaphor acquired not only a more religious flavour, but also a mean-
ing that presented Turkey as a possible spokesperson for Islam.
Such a shift was not without reason. As his predecessors did, Erdogan
was trying to make a case for Turkey’s EU membership by highlighting
Turkey’s location, function, and identity albeit in a less religiously neutral
way. This especially was to deflect the criticism coming from the EU regarding
the slowdown of the EU reforms.59 Being a bridge between “Islam and the
West,” was thought of as a handy rhetorical tool to justify Turkey’s stance not
only towards the EU, but also towards the Middle East.
Erdogan’s speech delivered at the American Enterprise Institute, in
Washington, DC, in 2004, is a good example of the amalgamation of the older
secular rhetoric with a more religious one, and of presenting Turkey to the
Middle East as brothers in religion. In this speech, Erdogan, still maintained
the argument that Turkey could be a “model” to the Muslim world “in an
inspirational way,”60 and stated that “the secular and democratic structure of
Turkey, a country which acts as a bridge between the East and the West,
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Islam and Christianity, as well as Europe and Asia, lives in harmony with
traditions footed in Islamic culture.”61 He heralded Turkey’s “new” role in
the Middle East by saying that
with its own stable and successful model of development, its place in
the Western world, and its rich historical legacy and identity, Turkey will
be a symbol of harmony of cultures and civilizations in the 21st century.
Turkey will help achieve this not merely through its economic and
military power, but its ability to make contributions to the universally
accepted values and facilitate their dissemination and interaction among
various parts of the world. In this sense, Turkey in its region and
especially in the Middle East will be a guide in overcoming instability, a
driving force for economic development, and a reliable partner in ensur-
ing security.62
Indeed, during the AKP’s first term, Turkey took several steps towards
the Middle East that were somewhat controversial, but reflected the AKP
government’s desire to make Turkey a “bridge” to the Middle East, and
more importantly to the Islamic world. Turkey was presented in such a way
that, having a predominantly Muslim population enabled the country to
understand the dynamics of the Middle East. When, for example, the United
States introduced the Greater Middle East Project, the members of the AKP
government very explicitly stated that they would “move together with the
United States for the Greater Middle East Project, in order to bring freedom
and democracy to Islamic countries.”63 Turkey frequently expressed its
interest in mediating the conflict between Israel and Palestine, something
which did not find many supporters in the Middle East.64 Partially as a result
of this, and partially because of the AKP’s desire to act on the problem,
Khaled Mashaal, the political leader of Hamas, was invited to Ankara by the
AKP in February 2006, which created a mini diplomatic crisis between
Turkey and Israel.65 Finally, the upper echelons of the AKP offered to play
the mediator role yet again between “the West and Islam,” during the
infamous Danish Cartoon Crisis of February–March 2006.66 In the latest
series of mediator roles that Turkey wanted to play, talks between Israel
and Syria were hosted in Istanbul, in July 2008.67 In sum, the “bridge”
metaphor helped the AKP government lead Turkey to achieve several goals.
First, like before, the “bridging” discourse made the case for the continued
utility of Turkey to Europe. Second it justified Turkey’s active policy in the
Middle East. The discourse that accompanied all these was one that seem-
ingly presented Turkey as a mediator between Islam and Christianity, but in
reality, was attempting to speak for Muslim countries. The introduction of
Islam into the civilisations discourse, not only altered the meaning of the
bridge metaphor, but also disturbed the liminal category that Turkey was
placed in. As Islam is innate to neither to Europe nor to the EU, Turkey
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moved from being liminal to being liminal-marginal, making itself even
harder to categorise.
CONCLUSION
No foreign policy activity can develop in a vacuum. It has to be supported
by a discourse. The discourse that a policy choice is embedded in not only
justifies the choice, but helps foreign policy makers frame it for themselves
as well as for their domestic and international audiences. What is more
important than the discourse in which the foreign policy choice is
implanted, are the discursive strategies used to formulate this discourse.
That is, saying that the location of Turkey (or some other country) is
“important” is different from saying that Turkey is a “bridge.” In the Turkish
case, a metaphor that seemingly highlights only a country’s location means
much more. It gives us clues about the role a state wants to play, thus
contributing to the international self of that country. Overall, the choice of
metaphor tells us much about the visions – geopolitical, functional and
ideational – of a country.
This paper also shows that, although metaphors employed stayed the
same, the meaning of the metaphor changed. Tracing the way Turkish
officials used the “bridge” metaphor since the end of the Cold War, this
paper illustrated that initially, the “bridge” metaphor stemming from the
“exceptional” geography, in the early 1990s became a discursive strategy
supporting the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy to its East, especially
with the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union. Turkey during those
years was predominantly portrayed as “bridging continents,” meaning that it
was willing to become a model/facilitator/stabiliser for the newly emerging
Eurasia. After the 9/11 attacks, with the advance of the AKP to power, on
the other hand, the “bridge” metaphor combined with the civilisation
discourse that had already been in circulation, gained more strength carry-
ing a more religious, less secular meaning, helping portray Turkey as a
spokesperson of Islam. This was thought to be a strategy justifying Turkey’s
continued usefulness for Europe as well as its policy in the Middle East.
However, regardless of the strategy, justifying and framing a policy does not
guarantee a successful outcome.
The use of “bridge” metaphor in the Turkish context contains an
inherent paradox. First, the use of bridge metaphor reinforces Turkey’s
not just any “othering” but its “liminality.” And, since the “bridge”
metaphor is a metaphor of vision, this othering not only happens in terms
of geography, but in terms of values, and recently religion, as well. Of
course, Turkish officials are not alone in producing and reproducing of
Turkey’s liminal position. Many others, such as Americans,68 Germans,69
and EU Commissioners70 have described Turkey as a “bridge.” Even those
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who did not agree with the “bridge” metaphor, such as former German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt71 who claimed that Turkey was not a bridge,
contributed to the discourse, and reinforced Turkey’s liminality simply by
putting Turkey’s “bridgehood” one more time into circulation – albeit in a
negative fashion.
Though liminality is sometimes branded as a bad thing, certain
countries may want to create a label of liminality as Turkey does. The
“bridge” metaphor gave this exact discursive support that Turkish foreign
policy makers in the post–Cold War international order needed to prove
their usefulness to Europe and to advance their particular foreign policy
agendas for Eurasia and the Middle East. The viability of this discursive
strategy, however, is very much open to question, especially when there are
many other issues on Turkey’s to-do list in order to become an EU member.
As interesting as the adoption of liminality may be, this discourse started a
cycle that looks enigmatic, yet is dangerous because it discursively and
practically reinforces Turkey’s liminal, no matter what spin Turkey’s foreign
policy makers put on it.
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